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Ethics, Morality, and Professional Responsibility
Dallin H. Oaks*
We are not here to start a law school but to recognize the
maturity of one that has come of age with the arrival of its third
class, the assembling of most of its faculty, and the completion
of its magificent quarters. It is therefore unnecessary to review the
formal charges given to the law school faculty and students two
years ago at the ceremony commemorating the 0pening.l Rather,
these remarks will add one additional charge, which concerns the
J. Reuben Clark Law School's special challenges and opportunities for leadership in teaching ethics, morality, and professional
responsibility.
During my first month of law studies a t the University of
Chicago, 21 years ago this fall, Professor Karl N. Llewellyn introduced us to Carl Sandburg's poem, "The Lawyers Know Too
Much." I share it with you now because it provides a suitable
introduction for my subject.
"The lawyers, Bob, know too much.
They are chums of the books of old John Marshall.
They know it all, what a dead hand wrote,
A stiff dead hand and its knuckles crumbling,
The bones of the fingers a thin white ash.
The lawyers know
a dead man's thoughts too well.
"In the heels of the higgling lawyers, Bob
Too many slippery ifs and buts and howevers,
Too much hereinbefore provided whereas,
Too many doors to go in and out of.
"When the lawyers are through
What is there left, Bob?
Can a mouse nibble at it
And find enough to fasten a tooth in?
"Why is there always a secret singing
When a lawyer cashes in?
Why does a hearse horse snicker
Hauling a lawyer away?
*President, Brigham Young University. The research assistance of Ted D. Lewis is
gratefully acknowledged.
1. Copies of the addresses delivered at the ceremony of August 27, 1973 opening the
J. Reliben Clark Law School are available on request from the Office of the Dean.
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"The work of a bricklayer goes to the blue.
The knack of a mason outlasts a moon.
The hands of a plasterer hold a room together,
The land of a farmer wishes him back again.
Singers of songs and dreamers of plays
Build a house no wind blows over.
The lawyers-tell me why a hearse horse snickers
hauling a lawyer's bones. "2

Despite unprecedented demand for admission to law schools
and an unequaled record of public leadership and service by graduates of law schools, the legal profession is still the subject of
widespread public misunderstanding and mistrust. For example,
a recent nationwide survey of adults in all income groups, conducted by the American Bar Association Special Committee to
Survey Legal Needs, of which I am a member, shows that more
than one-third of our fellow Americans believe that most lawyers
would engage in unethical or illegal activities to help a client in
an important case, and that more than one-third also believe that
lawyers are not concerned about doing anything with "the bad
apples" in the legal profe~sion.~
Happily, seven out of eight of
those who had personally used legal services gave their own lawyer high marks for his honesty in dealing with them.4In the same
survey, persons were asked to identify the personal qualities of
greatest importance in their decision whether or not to retain a
particular lawyer. The qualities of greatest importance to this
decision were the lawyer's general reputation and his ethical standards, including honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness. The
number of persons who mentioned these qualities was three times
the number who mentioned c ~ m p e t e n c e . ~
While a significant segment of the public persists in its traditional suspicion of the bar, the legal profession haggles over who
is to blame. The organized bar criticizes the law schools for failing
to be more effective in teaching professional responsibility, while
legal scholars charge the organized bar with failing to be effective
in professional discipline. In an atmosphere of heightened concern about the ethical standards of the legal profession, we remain unsure of our remedies.
2. Sandburg, The Lawyer Knows Too Much, quoted in K . Llewellyn, The Bramble
Bush 142 (1951).
3. Curran & Spalding, The Legal Needs of the Public, ABA SPECIAL
COMM.
TO SURVEY
LEGAL
NEEDS94, 96 (Prelim. Report 1974).
4. ABA Special Comm. to Survey Legal Needs, Responses to Questionnaire, Part IV,
Question 40.
5. Id. Part V, Questions 4 & 5.
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Retired Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark, a leader in the
move for higher standards at the bar, has declared that "law
schools must consciously undertake the one task that they have
universally rejected: instilling normative values in their students." Explaining the increasing importance of teaching honesty
and integrity in law schools, he observes that the influences of
church and family, which formerly developed these virtures,
"have drastically diminished in importance in this country, and
no other force has arisen to take their place?
In contrast, Dean Albert M. Sacks of the Harvard Law
School is quoted as giving his opinion that the law schools do not
have any clear sense of how to teach legal ethics.' Voicing a common opinion of legal educators, UCLA Law Dean Murray L.
Schwartz argues that formal legal education is not likely to contribute much to the moral and ethical development of law students because their notions of ethics and morality are established
before they arrive at law school and because law schools are not
organized or conducted to inculcate such standards in any case?
This is because the law teacher is typically theoretical, skeptical,
scholarly, and remote from his students, and all of these characteristics inhibit instruction in ethics and morality.
The promotion of moral and ethical concerns among law students is apparently no more effective in church-related institutions. In the words of Dean Thomas L. Shaffer of Notre Dame
Law School, "most of the law faculties a t what were once thought
to be the great Protestant Christian universities appear uninterested in their institutional heritage, if not ashamed of it," and
"[llaw faculties in Roman Catholic universities have rarely
passed beyond fruitless phrases about natural law, which long ago
became a banner rather than an idea, and is now neither banner
nor idea.
Former Stanford Dean Bayless Manning agrees that law
schools cannot teach a student to become a n ethical human
being. He points the finger a t the organized bar, charging that "if
the bar's disciplinary standards were clear and stringent and en6. Clark, Teaching Professional Ethics, 12 SANDIEGOL. REV.249, 252-53 (1975).
7 . Brooks, The President's Page, 18 BOSTON
B.J. 3, 6 (1974), quoted in Manning, A
Socio-Ethical Foundation for Meeting the Obligations of the Legal Profession, 5
L. REV.237, 238 (1974).
CUMBERLAND-SAMFORD
AND THE LAW
8. Schwartz, Legal Ethics u. Common Notions of Morality, LEARNING
40'47-48 (Spring 1975);see also Weckstein, Watergate and the Law Schools, 12 SANDIEGO
L. REV.261, 265-66, 273-74 (1975).
9 . Shaffer, Christian Theories of Rofessional Responsibility, 48 S . CAL.L. REV.72122 (1975).
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forcement an ever-present reality, the law schools could and
would drive home to their students that it is a condition of being
in the profession that the lawyer be not only a noncriminal but
an exemplar of lawful conduct . . . . [which would be] the kind
of moral and legal leadership the public is entitled to expect from
. . . officers of the court."1°
Our two honored judicial guests and honorary degree recipients have both been leaders in trying to raise the ethical standards of the bar. For example; during his term as President of the
American Bar Association, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. made
professional ethics a major area of emphasis, launching an ambitious program that was to culminate in a full review of the old
ABA Canons of Professional Ethics." Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger has repeatedly used the weight of his high office, such as
in his remarks this morning12 and in his influential annual addresses on the "State of the Judiciary," to call for and point the
way toward increased attention to ethical questions by law
schools and to professional discipline by the organized b a d 3
As a consequence of these efforts and others, we are in a time
when ethics, morality, and professional responsibility are among
the most important concerns of the legal profession, including
practitioners, teachers, and the judiciary.
There are also stirrings of concern about the deeper values
from which we obtain our commitments to law, morality, ethics,
and professional responsibility. In his recent book, The Interaction of Law and Religion, Professor Harold J. Berman of the
Harvard Law School comments on the "integrity crisis" of Western society, observing that "[o]ur whole culture seems to be
facing the possibility of a kind of nervous breakdown."14 The
major symptom of this threatened breakdown is the apparent
widespread loss of confidence in our two most basic institutions,
law and religion. He finds one cause of the current disillusionment in "the too radical separation of onefrom the other."15 Law
helps to give society its cohesive structure, but it is religion that
10. Manning, If Lawyers Were Angels: A Sermon in One Canon, 60 A.B.A.J. 821,823
(1974);see genemlly Marks & Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal Profession: Is It SelfRegulation? 1974 U . ILL. L.F. 193.
11. Powell, The President's Annual Address: The State of the Legal Bofession, 51
A.B.A.J. 821, 825 (1965).
12. Burger, The Role of the Lawyer in Modem Society, supra this issue.
13. Burger, The State of the Judiciary-1975,61 A.B.A.J. 439,440-41 (1975);see also
J . 18 (1970).
Burger, The Future of Legal Education, 15 STUDENTLAWYER
14. H . BERMAN,
THEINTERACTION
OF LAWAND RELIGION
21 (1974).
15. Id. at 23.
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gives life and emotional attachment to that structure. In the
forthcoming and final book of their Story of Civilization series,
Will and Ariel Durant observe that "the Twentieth Century approaches its end without having yet found a natural substitute for
religion in persuading the human animal to morality."16 Berman
says that the secularists and rationalists, who rely on an intellectual commitment to law, have drained law of its emotional vitality because their utilitarian ethic cannot sustain public support
for the law. The emotion that ties us to the law is our belief in
its "inherent and ultimate rightness," a belief fostered most effectively by religion. Consequently, Professor Berman concludes
that "law and religion stand or fall together; and if we wish law
to stand, we shall have to give new life to the essentially religious
commitments that give it its ritual, its tradition, and its authority

....

"17

To me there is a close relationship between the weakening of
religious faith and commitment to transcendent values on the one
hand, and on the other, the legal profession's current and intense
preoccupation with legal rights and procedures, which sometimes
seems to hamper our view and pursuit of the ultimate goals of
truth and justice. As religious commitments weaken, we are more
likely to have our attention diverted from ultimate values to others merely implementary.
While serving as a law clerk for the late Chief Justice Earl
Warren of the United States Supreme Court, I read hundreds of
handwritten petitions in which persons convicted of crimes
sought relief from the Nation's highest court. I was struck with
the fact that these prisoners rarely asserted their innocence.
While understanding the reasons why an appellate court must
focus on the procedural fairness of the trial and does not ordinarily review the question of guilt or innocence, I was nevertheless
amazed that nonlawyers convicted of crimes realize so soon that
once they are convicted a t trial, our criminal justice system focuses on procedure, treating the fact of their guilt or innocence
as almost entirely beside the point. The preoccupation with procedure is coming to be predominant, even in the trial court. Justice Walter V. Schaefer of the Illinois Supreme Court is only one
of many astute judges who has complained that
[Allmost never do we have a genuine issue of guilt or innocence
today. The system has so changed that what we are doing in the
16. Merry, The Age of the Durants, the National Observer, Aug. 2, 1975, at 20,
col. 1.
supra note 14, at 24-25, 36-37.
17. BERMAN,
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courtroom is trying the conduct of the police and that of the
prosecutor all along the line. Has there been a misstep a t this
point? a t that point? You know very well that the man is guilty;
there is no doubt about the proof. But you must ask, for example: Was there something technically wrong with the arrest?
You're always trying something irrelevant. The case is determined on something that really hasn't anything to do with guilt
or innoccence.l8

The operation of the exclusionary rule, which I have criticized
elsewhere,l9 provides another example.
Some of you will be saying, "But our procedural guarantees
are designed to serve the ends of truth and to protect personal
rights of fundamental importance to truth and justice." I agree.
I am criticizing, not our concern with procedures, but our preoccupation, in which we may lose sight of the fact that our procedures are not the ultimate goals of our legal system. Our goals are
truth and justice, and procedures are but means to these ends.
When we lose sight of this relationship, then some procedures can
cease to serve their designed objectives. In the long run that result
will discredit law and the legal profession. "Too many slippery ifs
and buts and howevers," Sandburg says, "[tloo many doors to
go in and out of. . . . Why does a hearse horse snicker [hlauling
a lawyer away?"
Truth and justice are ultimate values, so understood by our
people, and the law and the legal profession will not be worthy of
public respect and loyalty if we allow our attention to be diverted
from these goals. It is surely past time for serious consideration
of the recent American Assembly charge that
Too often our adversary techniques conceal or distort the truth
rather than promote its discovery. The legal profession should
consider and explore appropriate modifications of adversary
procedures for the purpose of better determining the truth, and
should formulate ethical prescriptions embracing a higher professional duty to seek the truth.*O

Judge Marvin E. Frankel developed this point brilliantly in
"The Search for Truth," his recent Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture
before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. La18. Schaefer, A Center ReportlCrimiml Justice, THECENTER
MAGAZINE
69, 76 (Nov.
1968), quoted in M. Frankel, The Search for Truth-An Umpireal View, 31st Annual
Benjamin Cardozo Lecture to the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Dec.
16, 1974, at 13-14.
19. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI.L. REV.
665 (1970).
20. THEAMERICAN
ASSEMBLY,
LAWAND A CHANGING
SOCIETY
12 (1975).
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menting the fact that the adversary process "often achieves truth
only as a convenience, a by-product, or an accidental approximation," Judge Frankel observes that "our relatively low regard for
truth-seeking is perhaps the chief reason for the dubious esteem
in which the legal profession is held."21 And the point reaches
beyond reputation to reality. Judge Frankel suggests that we are
not likely to promote high moral standards in a dispute-resolving
system that focuses on something other than truth: "In a system
that so values winning and deplores losing, where lawyers are
trained to fight for, not to judge, their clients, where we learn as
advocates not to 'know' inconvenient things, moral elegance is
not to be expected."22
To cite a related deficiency, as a profession we are preoccupied with rights and, as Elliot Richardson noted a few years ago,
"have increasingly and unceremoniously ignored the subject of
obligations. At no time in history have we ever been more deficient in our sense of obligation than we are today. The hoary and
hallowed indebtedness of a person to family, to tribe, to customs
and gods, seems to have slipped away like a guest a t a much too
crowded party."23 The history of the American Bar Association's
Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities provides an
illustration. The word "responsibilities" was added to the title of
that section by some farsighted persons who foresaw what might
happen but were unable by that measure to prevent it. As a
member of that section from the time of its founding, I have seen
it concentrate almost exclusively upon the subject of rights. This
is the legal profession's instinctive thrust. In relation to rights, we
appear as gladiators, guarantors, and enforcers. On the subject of
responsibilities, the law is a schoolmaster and the legal profession
its faculty. And who would not prefer the role of champion of
rights rather than preacher of responsibilities? Clients conventionally retain lawyers to secure an advantage under the adversary system, not to receive a lecture on their own deficiencies and
their advocate's higher loyalties to the law. "Perhaps obligations
took their quiet departure in the face of the rampant relativism
of the day," Elliot Richardson suggests. "A sense of obligation
implies, after all, a knowledge of right and wrong, and this in turn
implies standards on which a society agrees."24
So what, if anything, can the law schools do?
21.
22.
23.
24.

M. Frankel, supra note 18, at 12-19.
Id. at 40.
Richardson, On Behalf of Obligations, 8 LINCOLN
L. REV.109 (1973).
Id. at 110.
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Responsibilities of both lawyers and clients should be no
stranger to the law school curriculum. Law schools can surely
sensitize their students to professional problems by identifying
and clarifying issues of legal ethics, a conventional and well recognized technique of law teaching.25To fail in this minimal role
is to leave law students to infer that value judgments are not a
significant part of a lawyer's function.26Law faculties must at
least overcome their traditional lack of interest in moral, ethical,
and professional problems. Conscientious and articulate disagreement among different law teachers on a particular moral and
ethical issue is surely preferable to implied pretensions of unanimity that students will disbelieve and read as judgments of indifference on matters of ethics and morality.
But law schools can do-more than this, and the J. Reuben
Clark Law School has the most promising ideals and circumstances to be a leader in this important area. Notre Dame Dean
Thomas L. Shaffer has noted sadly that "Christianity has had too
little to do with what is hopeful in the American legal profession.
I believe that a motivating reason for that failure is our diffidence
in talking about religious commitment; when few talk about religion, personal value is inaccessible and public style becomes irreligious. Too many candles are under too many bushels."27
We have no diffidence in talking about religious commitment
a t Brigham Young University, and we will have none in the J.
Reuben Clark Law School. Religious commitment, religious values, and concern with ethics and morality are part of the reason
for this school's existence, and will be in the atmosphere of its
study. As President Marion G. Rornney," our third honorary degree recipient, noted in our opening ceremonies, this law school
was established to provide an institution in which students could
"obtain a knowledge of the laws of man in the light of the laws
of God," and the trustees would like this school to reflect the aura
of President J. Reuben Clark: "faith, virtue, integrity, industry,
scholarship, and patrioti~m."~~
If it is true that law students cannot be taught ethics and
morality in law school because those value commitments are
25. Weckstein, supra note 8, at 274.
26. Schwartz, supra note 8, at 50.
27. Shaffer, supra note 9, at 722.
28. Second Counselor in the First Presidency of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints and Second Vice President of the Board of Trustees of Brigham Young University.
29. Addresses at t.he Ceremony Opening the J. Reuben Clark Law School, Aug. 27,
1973, at 20-22.
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fixed before they enroll, then that fact, an excuse for other law
schools, becomes a unique opportunity for this one. Most of the
students and faculty a t this law school are rooted in the same
religious tradition, and that tradition more than any other fact
accounts for their choosing this setting to pursue their professional goals. The common ideals, principles, and commitments of
that tradition should make this institution superbly effective in
strengthening the moral, ethical, and professional foundations
that compose the finest heritage of our profession.
Because of our reliance on these common ideals, principles,
and commitments, the new building being dedicated today
should not be looked on as a place where we apply some unique
formula for inculcating ethics and morality. It is, rather, a monument to our determination that the fairness, decency, integrity,
virtue, and love of truth taught a t the hearthstones of thousands
of homes throughout the land shall have a concentrated impact
on the legal profession and the Nation's laws. It is in these homes,
by God-fearing parents, that the young men and women who will
be our graduates have already gained that intangible moral instinct that will bear its fruits in the legislative halls, the courtrooms, the offices, and other private and public places in the
years to come. Thus, this consideration of our law school's special
challenges and opportunities would be incomplete without some
grateful acknowledgement for those homes, those fathers, and
those mothers. They may well be the most important teachers our
graduates will ever have.
To illustrate what the law school could do with this unique
resource, I will borrow and share with you an excerpt from a
memorandum that Acting Dean Carl S. Hawkins circulated to
the law faculty just a month ago inviting them to begin a process
of defining "The Distinctive Qualities of the J. Reuben Clark Law
School." That memorandum included the following proposals:
1. We should be distinguished by the degree of our commitment to the development of our individual students, based upon
our revealed knowledge as to the unique worth and dignity of
each individual as a child of God.
2. The Law School should be distinguished by its efforts to
research, publish, and teach the Judeo-Christian value assumptions underlying the development of our legal system.
3. The Law School should be distinguished by its efforts to
discover and articulate
a. The ultimate spiritual values underlying our Constitutional system and how they may be adapted to different cultures,
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b. The ultimate spiritual values underlying our Common Law legal system, and
c. The moral and spiritual values underlying
professional responsibility.
4. The Law School should be distinguished by its efforts to
research, publish, teach, and work for legal reform in support of
family institutions.
5. The Law School should be distinguished by its efforts to
develop lawyering skills as tools to serve the needs of people in
the light of their unique worth and dignity as spirit children of
GO~.~O

These are only illustrations, but sufficient to highlight the
unique opportunities of and challenges to the J. Reuben Clark
Law School. Whether or not there is an excess of law graduates
now or in the future, the law, the legal profession, and this Nation
have need of a law school such as this, and we are proud to
introduce you to its faculty, its students, and this magnificent
building.
30. C. Hawkins, Memorandum to the Law School Faculty, July 23, 1975, at 4-5.

